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I.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
(A)

This is an action for trademark infringement under the Lanham Act,

15 U.S.C. § 1051, et seq, which arises “under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States,” and over which the District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to
15 U.S.C. § 1121 and 28 U.S.C. sections 1331, 1338(a), and common law claims
related to such Lanham Act claim, over which the District Court had supplemental
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
(B)

This is an appeal of the District Court’s judgment, based on its order

granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. [Excerpt of Record “ER” at
2.] Accordingly, this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal of a final decision of
the District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
(C)

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A), “the

notice of appeal . . . must be filed . . . within 30 days after the judgment or order
appealed from is entered.” The District Court entered its Judgment and Order
Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (“Order”) which are the
subject of this appeal on February 20, 2013. [ER 1, 2.] MTM filed its Notice of
Appeal on March 20, 2013. [ER 26.] Thus, the Notice of Appeal was timely filed
and this Court may properly exercise subject matter jurisdiction.
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This is an appeal from a final Judgment and Order Granting

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment that disposes of all parties’ claims.
II.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Did the District Court err in finding no likelihood of confusion as a matter of
law, and granting summary judgment in favor of Amazon on MTM’s1 trademark
claim, where, after a prospective customer searches for MTM Special Ops watches
on Amazon’s website, Amazon’s results screen prominently displays the “MTM
Special Ops” trademark used as the search term, followed by the display of
numerous watches manufactured by MTM’s direct competitors and offered for sale
by Amazon, without informing the customer that Amazon does not carry the MTM
Special Ops watches for which the customer searched?
III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This case arises out of Amazon’s practice, when a customer searches for a

specific product that Amazon does not carry, of displaying a search results page
that shows various competing products sold by Amazon, without at any time
1

Appellant Multi Time Machine, Inc. is referred to herein as “MTM.”
Respondents Amazon.com, Inc. and Amazon Services, LLC are collectively
referred to herein in the singular as “Amazon.”
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telling the customer that Amazon does not carry the product requested. As a result,
the costumer is left with the mistaken impression that the product Amazon is
offering is the requested product when in fact it is not.
After making a strategic business decision not to sell its watches through
Amazon’s website, either itself or through third party retailers, MTM discovered
that when potential customers go to the Amazon website and search for its watches
(for example, by searching for “mtm special ops”) Amazon’s results page displays
a list of numerous competitors’ watches sold by Amazon under a heading that not
only repeats the “search term” but also impermissibly uses MTM’s federally
registered trademark in order to deceive those conducting the search. Amazon’s
results page does not inform the customer that the “MTM special ops” watch for
which the customer searched is not available or that other alternative products are
being offered in its place. Instead, the customer is left with the misleading
impression that the products searched for are those displayed, when they in fact are
not.
As a result, MTM filed a complaint in the district court asserting claims
against Amazon for trademark infringement and unfair competition under the
Lanham Act and common law, and also asserted a claim for a violation of
California Business & Professions Code section 17200.

-31441768.4

Case: 13-55575

B.

09/26/2013

ID: 8797539

DktEntry: 8-1

Page: 12 of 60

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Amazon brought a motion for summary judgment in the District Court. The

District Court granted summary judgment in Amazon’s favor, finding that no
reasonable trier of fact could find a likelihood of confusion resulting from
Amazon’s use2 of MTM’s trademarks. The District Court entered judgment in
Amazon’s favor as a result. MTM appeals from that judgment and the order
granting summary judgment upon which it was based.
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A grant of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See Rearden LLC v.
Rearden Commerce, Inc., 683 F.3d 1190, 1202 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We exercise de
novo review over the District Court’s summary judgment rulings in favor of
Rearden Commerce.”); see also Au-tomotive Gold Inc. v. Volkswagen of America,
Inc., 603 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2010) ; Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape
2

In light of its ruling on likelihood of confusion, the District Court did not
resolve the issue of whether Amazon is using the mark in commerce. However,
the District Court correctly noted that “the Ninth Circuit has held that the use of a
trademark as a search engine keyword that triggers the display of a competitor’s
advertisement is a ‘use in commerce’ under the Lanham Act.” ER 10, citing
Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1144-45. The District Court further noted that
“because Amazon’s use [of the MTM trademarks] is in connection with the sale of
goods, it appears likely to be a ‘use in commerce’ both in the jurisdictional sense
and with respect to the statutory meaning.” The District Court’s conclusion in this
regard was correct and consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent. In any event, this
portion of the District Court’s ruling was not appealed by Amazon, and therefore
need not and should not be revisited here.
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Communications Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004) . In exercising such de novo
review, all evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. Rearden, supra at 1202 (“Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
to [the non-moving party], we must determine whether there are any genuine issues
of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the relevant
substantive law.”)
V.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A.

THE PARTIES
MTM is a watch manufacturer founded in 1990, which manufactures and

sells military style watches under numerous brand names, including MTM Special
Ops and MTM Military Ops. [ER 228, 286.] MTM owns the registered
trademarks for MTM Special Ops and MTM Military Ops, among other
trademarks. [ER 279, 441-464.]
Amazon is a large on-line retailer, whose “mission as a retailer is to be the
world’s most customer-centric company.” [ER 240, 245.] According to Amazon,
it “opened its virtual doors on the World Wide Web in 1995 and offers Earth’s
Biggest Selection of products.” [ER 227, 240.] Amazon has designed its website
to enable millions of unique products to be sold by both Amazon and third party
sellers across dozens of product categories. Id.
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MTM’S DECISION NOT TO SELL ITS WATCHES TO AMAZON OR
THROUGH AMAZON’S WEBSITE
MTM sells its watches directly through its own website and also sells its

watches through a limited number of authorized distributors. [ER 3, 291, 293.]
MTM has made a strategic decision not to sell its watches through Amazon’s
website. In this regard, MTM does not sell its watches to Amazon for resale on the
Amazon.com website. [ER 3, 228-229, 293-294.] Neither does MTM permit any
of its authorized distributors to sell its watches through the Amazon.com website.
[ER 3, 293-294.] As a result, MTM’s watches are not available for sale on the
Amazon.com website.
C.

AMAZON’S USE OF MTM’S TRADEMARKS TO SELL OTHER NONMTM WATCHES
When a potential customer looking for an MTM watch (e.g. an MTM

Special Ops watch), searches for that watch on Amazon’s website by using MTM’s
trademark (e.g. “mtm special ops” as a search term), the customer is presented with
the following results screen:
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[ER 229, 253.]3
Rather than displaying the MTM watches for which the customer expressly
searched or informing the customer that those watches are not available, Amazon’s
results page displays watches manufactured by Luminox and Chase-Durer. As
Amazon concedes, these watches “are very similar to the MTM Special Ops
watches and are, in fact, direct competitors.” [ER 232, 294.] A visual comparison

3

The screenshot presented here is a recent search results page showing the
results of Amazon.com search for “mtm special ops.” The screenshot is a more
recent, color version of the screenshot attached as Exhibit “A” to the Declaration
of Paul Jaye (“Decl. Jaye”) [ER 229, 253].
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of MTM’s watches and the Luminox watches displayed by Amazon makes clear
how visually similar the Luminox watches and MTM watches are:

[ER 208, 214.]4
The very first line of Amazon’s results screen states: “Search All mtm
special ops.” Directly below, the words “mtm special ops” appear in larger
orange-colored font, in quotation marks. While Amazon contends that this is a
mere “bread crumb,” which sets forth the search term entered by the customer, this
could also easily be viewed as the title of the search results displayed below.
Indeed, in the context of search engines, quotes typically denote to a user that an
4

The side by side screenshot presented here are from screenshots used in the
report of Appellant’s expert, William Alexander Markson (“Markson Report”) [ER
208, 214].
-81441768.4
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exact phrase is being used. [ER 209.] Some users with sufficient computer
experience may know that when they type keywords into a search field using
quotes, they are forcing the system to search for that very specific phrase and not
deviate from it at all in the results. Id. MTM’s expert offered the opinion that
“some of these users may see this nomenclature on the results [i.e. the use of
quotes around the search term on Amazon’s results page] as having similar
significance with regards to the presence of their keywords, especially in the
absence of any other labeling. Id.
Then, directly under the “mtm special ops” line is a line that states “Related
Searches: mtm special ops watch mtm watch.” Below the Related Searches line is
a gray bar, with the words “Showing 7 Results” on it. In other words, when a
customer searches for an “mtm special ops” watch on Amazon.com’s website, the
top of the search results page displays MTM’s trademarks, in whole or in part, no
fewer than four separate times, before displaying the result, without once
informing the customer that Amazon does not carry MTM Special Ops watches.
Displayed below the gray “Showing 7 Results” bar are various watches sold
by Amazon which are made by various competitors of MTM, such as Luminox. In
the above search screen the first displayed result is a watch entitled “Luminox
Men’s 8401 Black Ops,” with the words “by Luminox” written in smaller font to
the right of that title. A customer interested in purchasing one of the watches

-91441768.4
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displayed, clicks on the image and is then taken to a screen which provides
additional information regarding that product, with the customer’s search term
“mtm special ops watch” set forth at the top of the product information page. That
page also has a link for the customer to click on to purchase the displayed item.
Finally, a second set of results appears below the first set, entitled “Results
for “mtm special ops.” [ER 209.] The search terms on the second result set
contain the term “mtm” with a strike-through. Id. This suggests that the first set of
results contains the term “mtm” since it is displayed in a similar manner, but
without the strike through. [ER 209-210.]
D.

OTHER ON-RETAILERS’ PRACTICE OF INFORMING CONSUMERS
WHEN THEY DO NOT OFFER MTM WATCHES
In contrast to Amazon, other on-line retailers who do not carry MTM

Special Ops watches clearly inform their customers who search for such watches
that they do not offer them for sale, before suggesting alternative watches to the
customer. For example, on buy.com, when a customer searches for “mtm special
ops,” the customer is presented with a search results screen which states: “0 results
found . . . Sorry, your search for mtm special ops did not return an exact match.
Please try your search again.” [ER 215.] Similarly, when a customer searches for
“mtm special ops” on Overstock.com, the customer is presented with a results
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screen which states “Sorry, your search: ‘mtm special ops’ returned no results.”
[ER 216.]
Noting that other on-line retailers label their search results to inform
customers that they do not have the product searched for, the District Court
observed: “I think the question comes down to, does Amazon have an affirmative
duty under the facts of this case to say, We don’t have that. Here are some other
choices, or is it sufficient to do what they’ve done, which is just to take you to a
page that has a - - a bunch of watches that have names that are distinct from your
client’s products.” [ER 54.] In granting summary judgment in favor of Amazon,
the District Court incorrectly answered this question in the negative and found that
Amazon’s practice in this regard was sufficient as a matter of law. In so doing,
the District Court erred for the reasons discussed herein.
E.

ACTUAL CONFUSION RESULTING FROM AMAZON’S USE OF
MTM’S MARKS
Amazon acknowledges that MTM has anecdotal evidence of its customers

being confused by Amazon’s search screen. Amazon dismisses this evidence as
too vague and contends that it does not establish confusion. Amazon claims that
its evidence establishes an absence of actual confusion and the District Court
accepted this contention. However, if anything, the evidence presented by
Amazon confirms MTM’s anecdotal evidence of actual confusion.
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For example, Amazon concedes that a number of users who typed the search
term “mtm special ops” viewed the Luminox and Chase-Durer watches sold by
Amazon, placed them in an “Amazon shopping cart,” or purchased them.5 [ER
232, 241-242.] Additionally, Amazon presented evidence that it contended
establishes that a customer who searched for a Luminox watch was 21 times more
likely to purchase a Luminox watch than a customer who searched for an MTM
watch. [ER 19; ER 250-251.] But this same evidence establishes that at least
some customers who searched for an MTM Special Ops Watch in fact purchased a
Luminox watch. Amazon has presented no evidence to conclusively refute the
possibility that at least some of those purchases were made as a result of customer
confusion as to whether the watches purchased were affiliated with MTM, which at
least led to the customer’s initial interest in the watch ultimately purchased.
VI.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Amazon
on MTM’s action for trademark infringement based on Amazon’s use of MTM’s
5

The redacted text in Appellant’s Opening Brief contains confidential
information that have been redacted from the District Court Record pursuant to the
Protective Order entered by the District Court on July 10, 2012 (filed as Doc. #28).
Appellant will file paper copies of its unredacted Opening Brief and unredacted
volumes of its Excerpts of Record under seal pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 27-13.
Appellant is also filing a separately captioned notification setting forth the reasons
the sealing is required pursuant to Ninth Circuit Rule 12-13(b).
-121441768.4

Case: 13-55575

09/26/2013

ID: 8797539

DktEntry: 8-1

Page: 21 of 60

“MTM Special Ops” trademark to sell other non-MTM watches. As a preliminary
matter, likelihood of confusion is an intensely factual analysis, which is rarely
suitable for determination by summary judgment, and the District Court erred in
disposing of this issue by summary judgment here.
In granting Amazon’s motion for summary judgment despite the absence of
clear labeling informing the consumer that Amazon does not offer the MTM
watches for which the customer searched, the District Court diverged from a long
line of Ninth Circuit precedent. Since the infancy of the internet, the Ninth Circuit
has carefully balanced the rights of internet merchants to fairly sell their products,
with the obligation not to infringe on the trademarks of others. In Brookfield
Communications v. West Coast Entertainment Corporation, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir.
1999), the Court held that using another’s trademark in metatags to attract persons
searching for that trademark could potentially create initial interest confusion – and
liability under the Lanham Act. Next, in Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape
Communications Corporation, 354 F.3d 102 (9th Cir. 2004), the Court held that
when a search engine used trademark terms as keyed words in its search box,
which triggered the display of unlabeled banner advertisements, genuine issues of
material fact existed regarding the likelihood of consumer confusion resulting from
the Defendant’s use of the Plaintiff’s marks. Once again, the Court made clear that
liability could arise based on initial interest confusion, even when the user realized,
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upon clicking on the unlabeled banner advertisement, that it was not affiliated with
Playboy, the trademark holder. Finally, in Network Automation v. Advanced
Systems Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit considered
whether Network Automation’s use of the ActiveBatch trademark to advertise its
products through keyword advertising constituted a violation of the Lanham Act.
Although the Ninth Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction against such
practices, the Court made clear that the fact that the sponsored advertisements
triggered by the keywords searched were clearly labeled as sponsored links was
central to its decision.
The common thread in each of these cases is that liability under the Lanham
Act can only be avoided as a matter of law where there is clear labeling to avoid
the possibility of confusion – including initial interest confusion – resulting from
the use of another’s trademark. But absent clear labeling or other measures
communicating that the searcher is not viewing a product, advertisement or
website of the trademark owner, liability can arise under the Lanham Act as a
result of that possible confusion. Absent such clear labeling, a trademark
infringement suit under these circumstances cannot properly be disposed of on
summary judgment.
Here, the District Court erred by granting summary judgment in Amazon’s
favor, even though there is no labeling on Amazon’s results page informing the

-141441768.4
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customer that the MTM watches for which the customer searched are not available
or that Luminox is not affiliated with MTM. That the watches on the search screen
are identified as “Luminox” watches “by Luminox,” is not sufficient to support
summary judgment in Amazon’s favor, because a consumer could infer, from the
top of the search page which has the words “mtm special ops watch” set forth in
three different places that the Luminox watches displayed are types of MTM
Special Ops watches. Whether the Luminox brand is sufficiently well known to
avoid the likelihood of such confusion is part of the factual inquiry for the jury,
and is not appropriate for determination on summary judgment. By granting
summary judgment despite Amazon not clearly labeling its results page to state
that it does not sell the MTM watches for which the customer searched, the District
Court diverged from the Ninth Circuit’s authority requiring such labeling to
support an award of summary judgment in this context.
The District Court further erred in its application of the Sleekcraft factors, by
deciding certain of those factors as a matter of law rather than submitting them to
the jury and by failing to consider others, which weighed in favor of a finding of a
likelihood of confusion. As a result, the District Court erred in finding no
likelihood of confusion as a matter of law and granting summary judgment in favor
of Amazon.
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VII.
ARGUMENT
A.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUE OF LIKELIHOOD OF
CONFUSION IS DISFAVORED AND RARELY APPROPRIATE
As a preliminary matter, summary judgment on the issue of likelihood of

confusion is disfavored because of its multi-prong inquiry and fact intensive
nature. As the Court explained in Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret
Stores Brand Management, Inc., 618 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2010):
This case is yet another example of the wisdom of the
well-established principle that ‘[b]ecause of the intensely
factual nature of trademark disputes, summary judgment
is generally disfavored in the trademark arena.’
Entrepreneur Media, 279 F.3d at 1140 (quotation marks
omitted). We are far from certain that consumers were
likely to be confused as to the source of Victoria’s
Secret’s pink tank top, but we are confident that the
question is close enough that it should be answered as a
matter of fact by a jury, not as a matter of law by a court.
See also Rearden, supra, at 1202, 1210; Xen, Inc. v. Citrix Systems, Inc. 2012 WL
5289609 at *3 and *5 (C.D. Cal.) (Pregerson, J.) (citing Au-Tomotive Gold, Inc. v.
Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 457 F.3d 1062, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006)). Thus, summary
judgment is “rarely appropriate,” Xen at *5, and granted “sparingly, as careful
assessment of the pertinent factors that go into determining likelihood of confusion
usually requires a full record.” Rearden, 683 F.3d at 1210.
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WELL-ESTABLISHED NINTH CIRCUIT PRECEDENT MAKES CLEAR
THAT PRODUCT OFFERINGS OR ADVERTISEMENTS ON THE
INTERNET MUST BE CLEARLY LABELED TO AVOID CONSUMER
CONFUSION AND LIABILITY UNDER THE LANHAM ACT
The Ninth Circuit has established a line of precedent, dating back to the

infancy of the internet, which carefully balances the needs of internet commerce
with the obligation imposed by the Lanham Act to avoid the likelihood of
consumer confusion and trademark infringement. In the internet context, when
another entities’ trademarks are used, Lanham Act liability can only be avoided as
a matter of law where steps are taken to avoid consumer confusion regarding what
products are being viewed or accessed. This line of Ninth Circuit precedent is
consistent with “[t]he basic policy behind the Lanham Act [which is] is to protect
customers against likelihood of confusion.” International Order of Job’s
Daughters v. Lindeberg & Co., 633 F.2d 912, 917 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 941 (1981); Monsanto Chemical Co. v. Perfect Fit Products Manufacturing
Co., 349 F.2d 389, 395 (2d Cir.1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 942 (1966).
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Brookfield Communications Holds that Using Another’s
Trademark in Metatags Constitutes a Violation of the Lanham
Act by Causing Initial Interest Confusion

The Ninth Circuit addressed the intersection between internet commerce and
the requirements of the Lanham Act in Brookfield Communications v. West Coast
Entertainment Corporation, 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999). In Brookfield, the
Court held that the defendant’s use of the www.moviebuff.com domain name and
the use of “MovieBuff” in its metatags to attract internet searchers constituted
infringement of the Plaintiff’s MovieBuff trademark. In reaching this conclusion,
the Brookfield court stated that the district court had “apparently assumed that
likelihood of confusion exists only when consumers are confused as to the source
of a product they actually purchase.” Id at 1057. In fact, Brookfield noted that
“[i]t is, however, well established that the Lanham Act protects against the many
other forms of confusion that we have outlined.” In particular, Brookfield
explained:
Yet other forms of confusion are likely to ensue.
Consumers may wrongly assume that the ‘MovieBuff’
database they were searching for is no longer offered,
having been replaced by West Coast’s entertainment
database, and thus simply use the services at West
Coast’s web site. See, e.g., Cardservice Int’l, 950
F.Supp. at 741. And even where people realize,
immediately upon accessing ‘moviebuff.com,’ that they
have reached a site operated by West Coast and wholly
unrelated to Brookfield, West Coast will still have gained
-181441768.4
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a customer by appropriating the goodwill that Brookfield
has developed in its ‘MovieBuff’ mark. A consumer
who was originally looking for Brookfield’s products or
services may be perfectly content with West Coast’s
database (especially as it is offered free of charge); but he
reached West Coast’s site because of its use of
Brookfield’s mark as its second-level domain name,
which is a misappropriation of Brookfield’s goodwill by
West Coast.
Id. at 1057.
The Brookfield court found that the defendant’s use of moviebuff.com in
metatags “will still result in what is known as initial interest confusion.” Id. at
1062. In support of this ruling, the Court explained:
Web surfers looking for Brookfield’s ‘MovieBuff’
products who are taken by a search engine to
‘westcoastvideo.com’ will find a database similar enough
to ‘MovieBuff’ such that a sizeable number of consumers
who were originally looking for Brookfield’s product
will simply decide to utilize West Coast’s offerings
instead. Although there is no source confusion in the
sense that consumers know they are patronizing West
Coast rather than Brookfield, there is nevertheless initial
interest confusion in the sense that, by using
‘moviebuff.com’ or ‘MovieBuff’ to divert people looking
for ‘MovieBuff’ to its web site, West Coast improperly
benefits from the goodwill that Brookfield developed in
its mark.
Id.
In support of its holding with respect to the use of metatags, the Brookfield
Court explained that “[u]sing another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like
posting a sign with another’s trademark in front of one’s store.” Id. at 1064.
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In Playboy Enterprises, the Court Held the Use of Trademark
Terms to Trigger the Display of Unlabeled Banner
Advertisements Could Constitute a Violation of the Lanham Act

The Ninth Circuit again considered the application of the Lanham Act to the
internet in Playboy Enterprises v. Netscape Communications Corporation, 354
F.3d 102 (9th Cir. 2004). Playboy Enterprises involved a search engine’s use of
Playboy’s trademarks in lists for “keyed” banner advertisements. When a user
typed one of the trademarked terms (e.g. “playboy”), other companies’ banner ads
appeared on the results page with an invitation for the user to “click here.” Id. at
1023. When a user clicks on the banner ad, he is directed on the advertiser’s
website. Id. The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s granting of summary
judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that genuine issues of material fact
existed regarding the likelihood of consumer confusion resulting from the
Defendant’s use of PEI’s marks. In particular, the Court found summary judgment
inappropriate with respect to initial interest confusion. The Court explained:
In this case, PEI claims that defendants, in conjunction
with advertisers, have misappropriated the goodwill of
PEI’s marks by leading Internet users to competitors’
websites just as West Coast video misappropriated the
goodwill of Brookfield’s mark. Some consumers,
initially seeking PEI’s sites, may initially believe that
unlabeled banner advertisements are links to PEI’s sites
or to sites affiliated with PEI. Once they follow the
instructions to ‘click here,’ and they access the site, they
may well realize that they are not at a PEI-sponsored site.
-201441768.4
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However, they may be perfectly happy to remain on the
competitor’s site, just as the Brookfield court surmised
that some searchers initially seeking Brookfield’s site
would happily remain on West Coast’s site. The Internet
user will have reached the site because of defendants’ use
of PEI’s mark. Such use is actionable.
Id. at 1025-26.
Notably, in Playboy Enterprises, the court illuminated its holding by making
clear what was not at issue in that case. The Court explained:
[W]e are not addressing a situation in which a banner
advertisement clearly identifies its source with its
sponsor’s name, or in which a search engine clearly
identifies a banner advertisement’s source. We are also
not addressing a situation in which advertisers or
defendants overtly compare PEI’s products to a
competitor’s — saying, for example ‘if you are interested
in Playboy, you may also be interested in the following
message from[a different, named company].’ Rather, we
are evaluating a situation in which defendants display
competitors’ unlabeled banner advertisements, with no
label or overt comparison to PEI, after Internet users type
in PEI’s trademarks.
Id. at 1030.
Playboy Enterprises, like Brookfield which preceded it, makes clear that
when using another’s trademark on the internet, whether in metatags or in keyed
advertising, Lanham Act liability lies when the consumer is confused, even briefly,
and such confusion is not avoided by clear labeling to avoid any possible confusion
by the consumer.
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In a concurring opinion in Playboy Enterprises, Judge Berzon cautioned
against extending Brookfield to hold that there could be a Lanham Act violation
even where the search results are clearly labeled. She cautioned that “Brookfield
might suggest that there could be a Lanham Act violation even if the banner
advertisements were clearly labeled, either by the advertiser or by the search
engine. I do not believe that to be so.” Id. at 1034. While cautioning against an
overextension of the holding of Brookfield, Judge Berzon did not bring into
question – and in fact emphasized – the principle that liability under the Lanham
Act can arise where the consumer is initially confused as a result of the use of the
trademark of another, and where such initial interest confusion is not prevented by
clear labeling or otherwise.
3.

In Network Automation the Court Found no Likelihood of
Confusion Resulting From Clearly-Labeled Sponsored Links

Subsequently, in Network Automation v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc.,
638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011), the Ninth Circuit addressed whether a company can
use its competitors trademarks as part of a keyword advertising strategy, so that
when a consumer searches for the competitor’s trademark, the other company’s
sponsored advertisement appears on the results page. Specifically, in Network
Automation the Court considered whether Network Automation’s use of the
ActiveBatch trademark to advertise its products through keyword advertising was a
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legitimate use of readily available technology or a violation of the Lanham Act.
While the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of a preliminary
injunction against Network Automation, central to its decision was the fact that the
sponsored advertisements triggered by the keywords searched were clearly labeled
as sponsored links.
Indeed, in addressing this issue, the Court added the labeling and appearance
of the sponsored advertisements as an important factor to consider in the internet
context in addition to the Sleekcraft factors. The Court explained:
In the keyword advertising context the ‘likelihood of
confusion will ultimately turn on what the consumer saw
on the screen and reasonably believed, given the
context.’ Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F.
Supp. 2d 274, 289 (D. Mass. 2009). In Playboy, we
found it important that the consumers saw banner
advertisements that were ‘confusingly labeled or not
labeled at all.’ 354 F.3d at 1023. We noted that clear
labeling ‘might eliminate the likelihood of initial interest
confusion that exists in this case.’ Id. at 1030 n.43. The
appearance of the advertisements and their surrounding
context on the user’s screen are similarly important here.
The district court correctly examined the text of
Network’s sponsored links, concluding that the
advertisements did not clearly identify their source.
However, the district court did not consider the
surrounding context. In Playboy, we also found it
important that Netscape’s search engine did not clearly
segregate the sponsored advertisements from the
objective results. 354 F.3d at 1030. Here, even if
Network has not clearly identified itself in the text of its
ads, Google and Bing have partitioned their search
results pages so that the advertisements appear in
separately labeled sections for “sponsored” links. The
-231441768.4
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labeling and appearance of the advertisements as they
appear on the results page includes more than the text of
the advertisement, and must be considered as a whole.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
Thus, Network Automation follows Brookfield and Playboy Enterprises in
making clear that Lanham Act liability lies where an internet user is misled
regarding the site, advertisement or product viewed, even if such initial interest
confusion is quickly resolved. While finding there was no confusion where the
Defendant’s link was placed in a separate section of the search result screen clearly
labeled as “Sponsored Links,” Network Automation does not undermine the
principle that Lanham Act liability arises where an internet user is likely to be
misled regarding the site, advertisement or product viewed as the result of the use
of another’s trademark.
C.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF AMAZON, WHERE AMAZON’S SEARCH
RESULTS ARE NOT LABELED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT MTM
WATCHES ARE NOT BEING OFFERED
In granting Amazon’s motion for summary judgment, the District Court

diverged from the Ninth Circuit’s long line of precedent holding that when
trademarks are used in search engines or otherwise on the internet, search results
must be clearly labeled to avoid customer confusion. In concluding that summary
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judgment was warranted, the District Court failed to properly apply the Ninth
Circuit’s precedent requiring that proper labeling be employed to avoid consumer
confusion. The District Court also erred by relying on a hypothetical from Judge
Berzon’s concurring opinion in Playboy Enterprises which is inapposite to the
facts of the instant case.
1.

The District Court Erred by Failing to Properly Consider the
Absence of Labeling on Amazon’s Search Results Page

As discussed above, Network Automation, citing Playboy Enterprises, made
clear that the labeling and context of the displayed search results were an important
factor – in addition to the Sleekcraft factors – in determining whether there is a
likelihood of confusion in the context of internet search pages. The Network
Automation Court cited Playboy Enterprises on this point, explaining: “In Playboy,
we found it important that the consumers saw banner advertisements that were
‘confusingly labeled or not labeled at all.’” Id. at 1153-1154.
In its order granting summary judgment in favor of Amazon, the District
Court acknowledged that “the same central issue is at play where online retail
search results are concerned.” [ER 22.] In fact, the need for clear labeling is far
greater in the context of an online retailer such as Amazon than it is in the context
of a search engine such as Google. Online retailers such as Amazon offer specific
products for sale, while search engines such as Google provide a broad range of
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information related to a search term entered. As such, when a customer searches
for a specific product on an online retailer’s website, such as the Amazon.com
website, there is likely a greater expectation that the results offered for sale will be
the product for which the customer searched. In contrast, when a customer
performs a search on a search engine such as Google, the customer’s expectation is
not to be offered specific products which conform to the search, but rather to be
provided with a broad range of information related to the search term entered.
Therefore, clear labeling is even more important in the context of an on-line
retailer – especially one like Amazon, whose self-described mission is to be the
“most customer-centric company in the world”6 – than it is in the context of a
search engine, where such labeling is already required by Ninth Circuit precedent.
While acknowledging that “the same central issue is at play [with respect to
the requirement for labeling] where online retail search results are concerned,” the
District Court erred by failing to acknowledge, analyze or address Amazon’s
failure to clearly label its search results to make clear that the requested item was
not available, and that other suggested alternatives were displayed. Instead of
considering and addressing the lack of labeling on the search page, as Network
Automation and Playboy Enterprises require, the District Court confined its

6

ER 240, 245.
-26-
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analysis of this factor to a critique of MTM’s expert’s report. [ER 22-23.] The
District Court erred in this regard.
In fact, Amazon’s results page does not label its search results to make clear
that the products displayed are not the products searched for, rendering summary
judgment in Amazon’s favor inappropriate. When a consumer searches for “MTM
special ops” he or she is presented with the following search screen:

The top of the results screen shows the term “mtm special ops” three
separate times, above a gray bar, which states “Showing 1-7 results.” In the
absence of labeling stating that Amazon does not carry MTM Special Ops watches
or something to that effect, a reasonable consumer reviewing this results screen
-271441768.4
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could certainly conclude that the results displayed are in fact MTM Special Ops
watches, even though they are not. While it is true that the watches displayed are
identified as “Luminox” models with the words “by Luminox” in noticeably
smaller font, given the appearance of these watches under the display entitled
“mtm special ops watches,” a reasonable consumer could certainly conclude that
Luminox watches are types of watches offered by MTM. Whether this is sufficient
to have prevented any likelihood of confusion should have been decided by the
jury rather than by the District Court on summary judgment.
Such possible confusion could easily be avoided by providing clear labeling
that the watches displayed are not MTM Special Ops watches. Indeed, just as the
Playboy Enterprises court made clear that summary judgment was inappropriate
in that case because the banner advertisements were not labeled as such, and just as
the Network Automation Court found that a preliminary injunction was warranted
in light of the clear labeling of the sponsored links as “sponsored links,” so here
summary judgment would only have been appropriate if Amazon had clearly
labeled its search results to communicate that the watches displayed on the results
page were not the MTM Special Ops watches for which the customer had
searched, as numerous other on-line retailers do. By granting Amazon’s motion
for summary judgment in the absence of such labeling, the District Court has erred
and diverged from the Ninth Circuit’s authority.
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In its summary judgment motion, Amazon made much of the fact that a
consumer who came across the search results would have had to click on a product
picture, which would have led the consumer to a separate screen from where the
purchase would be made, and that this screen contained much more information
about the product, dispelling any likelihood of confusion. [ER 231, 247, 257, 259262, 277, 297.] Even if true, however, Playboy Enterprises makes clear that that
would not be sufficient to prevent the possibility of initial interest confusion to
support summary judgment. Indeed, in Playboy Enterprises, the Court reasoned:
“Some consumers, initially seeking PEI’s sites, may initially believe that unlabeled
banner advertisements are links to PEI’s sites or to sites affiliated with PEI. Once
they follow the instructions to ‘click here,’ and they access the site, they may well
realize that they are not at a PEI-sponsored site. However, they may be perfectly
happy to remain on the competitor’s site, just as the Brookfield court surmised that
some searchers initially seeking Brookfield’s site would happily remain on West
Coast’s site. The Internet user will have reached the site because of defendants’
use of PEI’s mark. Such use is actionable.” Playboy Enterprises, supra at 10251026.
Similarly, in this case, some customers who are looking to buy an MTM
Special Ops Watch may initially believe that the Luminox watches appearing on
Amazon’s search results screen are watches made by or otherwise affiliated with
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MTM. Once they click on the Luminox watch and are provided more information
about that watch, they might come to realize that it is not, in fact, an MTM watch.
But they might be perfectly happy to then purchase the Luminox watch from
Amazon instead of the MTM watch for which they initially searched. However,
this customer will have reached the purchase page and purchased the Luminox
watch because of Amazon’s use of MTM’s mark on its search results page. Here,
as in Playboy Enterprises, such use is actionable and the District Court erred by
granting summary judgment in Amazon’s favor.
2.

Judge Berzon’s Hypothetical to Which the Court Cited is
Inapposite

In support of its ruling erroneously granting summary judgment in favor of
Amazon, the District Court favorably cited the hypothetical presented by Judge
Berzon in her concurring opinion in Playboy Enterprises. But this hypothetical is
inapposite to the instant case. Judge Berzon imagines a hypothetical customer who
walks into Macy’s, asks for the Calvin Klein section, and is directed to the second
floor. Playboy Enterprises, supra at 1035. As such, in Judge Berzon’s
hypothetical, Macy’s has a “Calvin Klein section” and carries Calvin Klein
products. As a result, there is nothing deceptive, misleading or confusing in the
Macy’s clerk responding to the customer’s inquiry by directing the customer to the
second floor, where the Calvin Klein section is located, and no infringement if the
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customer comes across Macy’s competing line of products on the way. But this
hypothetical is inapposite to the instant case, because here it is undisputed that
Amazon does not sell MTM watches. [ER 3, 228-229, 293-294.] When a
customer asks for MTM watches, instead of being directed by Amazon to the
MTM watch section, the customer is presented with a screen of watches with no
labeling telling the customer that Amazon does not carry MTM watches. [ER 229,
246, 253.]
A more relevant hypothetical would be to imagine that Macy’s did not carry
Calvin Klein products, and the clerk, in responses to the customer’s inquiry, told
the customer that the “Calvin Klein” section was located on the second floor,
knowing that no Calvin Klein products were sold but hoping that the customer,
once on the second floor, would purchase Macy’s own product instead of the
Calvin Klein product which the customer requested. Suppose further that the
Charter Club products were located under a display with the words “Calvin Klein”
above it. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could conclude that there
was a likelihood of confusion, and that Macy’s had infringed on the Calvin Klein
mark by improperly benefitting from Calvin Klein’s goodwill in its mark. This is
true even if the customer realized before actually purchasing the product that it was
not in fact a Calvin Klein garment. See Playboy Enterprises, supra at 1035;
Brookfield, supra at 1064.
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Judge Berzon’s on-line hypothetical is inapposite for a similar reason. Judge
Berzon asks “If I went to Macy’s website and did a search for a Calvin Klein shirt,
would Macy’s violate Calvin Klein’s trademark if it responded (as does
Amazon.com for example) with the requested shirt and pictures of other shirts I
might like to consider as well? I very much doubt it.” Playboy Enterprises, supra
at 1035. (Emphasis added.) Again, in this hypothetical, the on-line retailer offers
the requested product for sale, and in response to a search for that product offers
the requested product, as well as other presumably clearly-labeled alternatives.
Under the Ninth Circuit’s precedent, this would not constitute infringement.
However, if the customer went to Macy’s website and did a search for a Calvin
Klein shirt, and the website displayed other shirts in response to the search, with
“Calvin Klein shirt” set forth in several places above the search results, without
informing the customer that it does not carry Calvin Klein shirts, a reasonable jury
could certainly find that Macy’s had infringed on the Calvin Klein mark by
improperly using Calvin Klein’s trademark in such a way that there is a reasonable
likelihood of confusion as a result of displaying search results offering competing
products without clearly labeling them as such. This conclusion is consistent with
Brookfield, Playboy Enterprises, and Network Automation. Granting summary
judgment in favor of Macy’s under these hypothetical circumstances would
diverge from and erroneously apply the standards articulated by the Ninth Circuit
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in these cases, just as the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Amazon did here.
D.

THE DISTRICT COURT ALSO ERRONEOUSLY APPLIED THE
SLEEKCRAFT FACTORS, BY IMPROPERLY DISREGARDING SOME
FACTORS AND MISAPPLYING OTHERS
The factors for determining likelihood of confusion are: “(1) strength of the

mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual
confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care
likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark;
and (8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines.” AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats,
599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
In Network Automation, the Court found that “[g]iven the nature of the
alleged infringement here, the most relevant factors to the analysis of the
likelihood of confusion are: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the evidence of actual
confusion; (3) the type of goods and degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser; and (4) the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and the
surrounding context on the screen displaying the results page.” But notably, the
Network Automation Court did not limit its analysis to these four factors. Instead,
the Court considered all eight Sleekcraft factors, in addition to the labeling and
appearance of the search results screen.
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A proper analysis of the Sleekcraft factors here makes clear that, at a
minimum, a reasonable jury could find a likelihood of confusion. In addition to
failing properly to consider the absence of labeling on Amazon’s results screen
discussed above, the District Court further erred by disregarding certain of the
Sleekcraft factors (Factors 2, 3, 5 and 7) and improperly applying others (Factors
1, 4 and 6), resulting in the erroneous granting of summary judgment in favor of
Amazon.
1.

The District Court Erred in Ruling on Summary Judgment that
the Strength of MTM’s Mark (Factor 1) Weighs in Favor of
Amazon

In Fortune Dynamic v. Victoria’s Secret, 618 F.3d 1025 (9th Cir. 2010), the
Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Defendant in a trademark infringement action. In doing so, the Court held that
there were questions of fact regarding both the conceptual and commercial strength
of the mark at issue, which should appropriately have been determined by a jury
rather than by the district court on summary judgment.
(a)

A Jury Could Property Determine that the MTM Special
Ops Mark is Conceptually Strong

With respect to conceptual strength, the Fortune Dynamic Court noted the
difficulty in determining whether a mark is descriptive or suggestive:
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Categorizing trademarks is necessarily an imperfect
science. Far from being neatly distinct and discrete,
trademark categories often ‘blur at the edges and merge
together.’ Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc.,
698 F.2d 786, 790 (5th Cir.1983), overruled in part by
KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I,
Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 116, 125 S.Ct. 542, 160 L.Ed.2d 440
(2004) ("KP Permanent I"). ‘The labels are more
advisory than definitional, more like guidelines than
pigeonholes. Not surprisingly, they are somewhat
difficult to articulate and to apply.’ Id.; see also
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 ("The lines of demarcation...
are not ... always bright."). The line between descriptive
and suggestive marks is nearly incapable of precise
description. Lahoti v. VeriCheck, Inc., 586 F.3d 1190,
1197 (9th Cir.2009) (‘[L]egions of trademark lawyers
can stay busy arguing about how marks in the middle, not
so plainly descriptive, nor so plainly [suggestive], should
be categorized.’).
Id. at 1033.
Whether the mark is categorized as “descriptive” or “suggestive” is an
important distinction, “because if the mark is suggestive, there is a stronger
likelihood that a jury could reasonably conclude that the ‘strength of the mark’
factor favors Fortune.” Fortune Dynamic 618 F.3d at 1034. There are two tests
which help distinguish between a descriptive and a suggestive mark. “First, a mark
is more likely suggestive if it passes the imagination test, which asks whether the
mark ‘requires a mental leap from the mark to the product.’ . . . Second, a mark is
more likely suggestive if it passes the competitor test, which asks whether ‘the

-351441768.4

Case: 13-55575

09/26/2013

ID: 8797539

DktEntry: 8-1

Page: 44 of 60

suggestion made by the mark is so remote and subtle that it is really not likely to be
needed by competitive sellers to describe their goods.’” Id.
In determining whether the DELICIOUS mark for shoes was descriptive or
suggestive, the Fortune Dynamic Court noted that some evidence pointed to
“DELICIOUS” being descriptive in the sense that it describes footwear which
“afford[s] great pleasure. ” Id. at 1034. But on the other hand, the Court explained
that “a reasonable jury, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
Fortune, might focus more on the ‘taste’ and ‘smell’ definitions of ‘delicious,’” in
which case “the connection between DELICIOUS and footwear becomes much
more attenuated, indicating that the mark is suggestive because it ‘requires a
mental leap from the mark to the product.’” Id. As a result, the Court found that
the strength of the DELICIOUS mark should have been determined by the jury, not
by the district court on summary judgment:
In sum, because ‘[w]hich category a mark belongs in is a
question of fact,’ . . . and because the decision as to
whether a mark is descriptive or suggestive ‘ ‘is
frequently made on an intuitive basis rather than as a
result of a logical analysis susceptible of articulation,’
Lahoti, 586 F.3d at 1197-98 (quoting Pizzeria Uno Corp.
v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1528 (4th Cir.1984)), we think
a jury should assess the conceptual strength of Fortune’s
mark in the first instance.
Id. (Emphasis added.)
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Similarly, in this case, the strength of MTM’s marks should be assessed by
the jury in the first instance, not by the court on summary judgment. As with the
“Delicious” mark for shoes, the term “MTM Special Ops” requires a leap of the
consumer’s imagination to determine that this is a mark for military style watches.
The term MTM SPECIAL OPS is inherently distinctive when applied to
watches. Even if the term “SPECIAL OPS” was descriptive (which it is not), the
mark as a whole is not. It is the mark in its entirety that must be considered—not
simply individual elements of the mark. See GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co.,
202 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000). Further, the validity of a composite mark
must be “determined by viewing the trademark as a whole, as it appears in the
marketplace” and not by dissection. Self-Realization Fellowship Church v.
Ananda Church of Self-Realization, 59 F.3d 902, 912 (9th Cir. 1995). Here the
term “MTM,” which is the dominant portion of the mark, does not describe the
purpose of the products with which it is used. See Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1058.
Rather, it “requires a mental leap from the mark to the product.” Id.
Even if the term “Special Ops” were considered without MTM, this term is
not descriptive as a matter of law. Rather “special ops” is a term for an elite
military team, not for a watch. It takes a leap of the imagination, upon hearing the
term “MTM Special Ops” to understand that the trademark is associated with a
watch. Indeed, even the District Court acknowledged that the mark could be found
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to be suggestive, stating that “they are at best suggestive.” [ER 17.] Accordingly,
here, as in Fortune Dynamics, “there is a stronger likelihood that a jury could
reasonably conclude that the ‘strength of the mark’ factor favors [MTM].” Fortune
Dynamic 618 F.3d at 1034. As a result, this factor should not have been
determined by the District Court on summary judgment.
Moreover, courts recognize that when a consumer uses a trademark to look
for a particular product, rather than a product category, that suggests that the
trademark is distinctive rather than descriptive. See Network Automation, supra at
1149 (“a consumer searching for a generic term is more likely to be searching for a
product category. . . . By contrast, a user searching for a distinctive term is more
likely to be looking for a particular product.”) Here Amazon presented evidence in
support of its motion that users of its web site have searched for the term “mtm
special ops” nearly 5,000 times and have searched for the term “mtm special ops
watch” over 14,000 times in the last five years. [ER 249-250.] This suggests that
consumers entering this search term were looking for MTM Special Ops watches,
the specific product for which they searched. See Network Automation at 1150
(“Because the mark is both Systems’ product name and a suggestive federally
registered trademark, consumers searching for the term are presumably looking for
its specific product, and not a category of goods.”) As such, this suggests, at a
minimum, that a reasonable jury could find that the strength of the mark factor
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weighs in MTM’s favor. Accordingly, the District Court erred by deciding to the
contrary on summary judgment.
(b)

A Jury Could Properly Determine that the MTM Special
Ops Mark is Commercially Strong

With respect to commercial strength, the District Court also erred by
deciding this issue on summary judgment. The District Court found that in the
absence of evidence of MTM’s market share, MTM failed to make a showing on
the commercial strength of its trademarks, which the District Court ruled was
necessary to establish commercial strength. But in Fortune Dynamics, the
Plaintiff, like MTM, here, presented evidence of its marketing expenditure and the
number of shoes sold from 2005 to 2007. Fortune Dynamics at 1034-35. After
noting that “advertising expenditures can transform a suggestive mark into a strong
mark,” the Fortune Dynamics court held with respect to Plaintiff’s evidence of its
advertising expenditure and its sales data that “[w]hatever its ultimate force, this
evidence is sufficient to make the relative commercial strength of the DELICIOUS
mark a question for the jury.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff’s 2011 sales totaled approximately $4.8 million, and its
advertising and marketing expenditures were $1.2 million. [ER 321.] Within at
least the last five years, Plaintiff has advertised its watches in various popular
magazines, such as Esquire, Men’s Journal and Men’s Fitness. [ER 331.] Plaintiff
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has used its mark MTM SPECIAL OPS since 1995. [ER 286.] As was the case in
Fortune Dynamic, this evidence is sufficient to make the relative commercial
strength of the MTM SPECIAL OPS and MILITARY OPS marks a question for
the jury, regardless of MTM’s market share.
2.

The District Court Erroneously Ruled that Amazon Established
an Absence of Actual Confusion and that This Factor (Factor 4)
Weighed in Favor of Amazon

As a preliminary matter, it is hornbook law that “actual confusion is not
necessary to a finding of likelihood of confusion under the Lanham Act.” Network
Automation, supra, at 1151 (internal quotation marks omitted). In any event, the
evidence presented by Amazon, rather than supporting Amazon’s claim that there
is evidence of an absence of confusion, in fact establishes the opposite: that at least
some consumers who went onto Amazon’s website and did a search for an “MTM
Special Ops watch” in fact purchased a Luminox watch. This evidence, on its
own, is sufficient for a reasonable jury to decide this factor in favor of MTM.
Additionally, the Court improperly rejected MTM’s evidence of actual confusion,
disregarding MTM’s evidence on this point as “too vague to constitute evidence on
this point.” [ER 21.] However, it is fundamental that on summary judgment, all
reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving
party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (1986).
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A reasonable jury could certainly have concluded, from both Amazon’s evidence
which showed that some customers purchased other watches on the search display
screen after customers had searched for an “MTM Special Ops watch,” combined
with MTM’s evidence of reported customer confusion arising from Amazon’s
display of other watches when an “MTM Special Ops watch” is searched, to
conclude that there was actual confusion to support a finding of a reasonable
likelihood of confusion. The District Court erred by ruling on this issue on a
summary judgment motion rather than presenting it to the jury for determination.
Both Amazon’s and the District Court’s reasoning in concluding that
Amazon presented evidence of an absence of actual confusion is flawed. First, as
mentioned above, even Amazon’s evidence establishes that at least some
customers purchased other watches from Amazon after searching for “MTM
Special Ops watches.” See Declaration of Paul Jaye, ¶ 13, identifying instances of
customers buying products from Amazon after searching for an “mtm special ops
watch.” [ER 250.] This alone refutes the suggestion that there is an absence of
actual confusion. Absent evidence establishing that each person who bought an
alternative product after searching for an “mtm special ops watch” was not
confused as to the product they purchased or whether such product was affiliated
with MTM – and no such evidence was presented by Amazon – Amazon has failed
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to establish an absence of actual confusion as it claims and as the District Court
erroneously found.
Additionally, in support of its conclusion that Amazon established an
absence of actual confusion, the District Court reasoned that “there is no reason to
think that those consumers searching for Luminox would exhibit different
behaviors form those searching for MTM Special Ops.” [ER 20.] This analysis is
flawed, because it suggests that every single customer who searches for “MTM
Special Ops Watches” and comes across a Luminox watch on the result screen
must be confused, in order for liability under the Lanham Act to arise. There is no
authority that requires that every single consumer who comes across an instance of
infringement must experience actual confusion for liability to arise. In fact, survey
evidence typically establishes a likelihood of confusion by showing that some
customers are confused by the infringement, not every single customer who comes
across the infringing mark. See e.g. Playboy Enterprises, supra, at 1026 (finding
that expert report established a genuine issue of material fact on actual confusion
where survey evidence showed that 51% of users shown the “playboy” term and
31% of users shown the “playmate” term believed that PEI sponsored or was
otherwise associated with the adult-content banner ad displayed.)
Accordingly, Amazon’s claim that it has established an absence of actual
confusion is without merit. While no showing of actual confusion by MTM is
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required, there was sufficient evidence of actual confusion for this issue to have
been submitted to the jury for determination. As such, the District Court erred in
disposing of this factor in Amazon’s favor on summary judgment.
3.

The District Court Erred by Deciding the “Degree of Care and
Type of Goods” Factor (Factor 7) on Summary Judgment,
without Considering All Evidence Pertinent to This Factor

In analyzing the degree of care and type of goods factor, the price of the
goods is not the only consideration. Consideration must also be given to the
marketing channels, and whether the products being sold are marketed primarily to
expert buyers. See Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1152. Moreover, even for
expensive goods “confusion may still be likely.” Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d at 353.
Because of the difficulty and fact intensive nature of determining the level of
sophistication of the likely consumers of a given product, this factor is
appropriately resolved by the jury. See Fortune Dynamics, supra at 1038
(“Whoever’s right, the difficulty of trying to determine with any degree of
confidence the level of sophistication of young women shopping at Victoria’s
Secret only confirms the need for this case to be heard by a jury.”)
The District Court erred by failing to consider any factors other than “the
relatively high price of the goods in question, combined with the increased degree
of care used in Internet purchases,” in concluding that “consumers are presumed to
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use a high degree of care in such purchases.” [ER 21.] The Court failed to
consider the fact that purchasers of the styles of watches are unlikely to be expert
consumers, or the fact that Amazon’s “one click” purchase method allows
consumers to buy products with less scrutiny than shopping in a brick and mortar
store, thus diminishing purchaser sophistication. [ER 247.]
In light of the totality of the evidence pertinent to this factor, this factor
should have been determined by the jury, rather than by the Court on summary
judgment.
4.

The District Court Failed to Consider Amazon’s Intent in Using
MTM’s Marks

The District Court also erred in failing to consider Amazon’s intent in using
MTM’s marks. In Network Automation, supra, the Court found that “the
defendant’s intent may be relevant here, but only insofar as it bolsters a finding
that the use of the trademark serves to mislead consumers rather than truthfully
inform them of their choice of products.” In reversing summary judgment in favor
of the defendants in Playboy Enterprises, supra, the Court explained:
This factor [i.e. Defendant’s intent] favors PEI
somewhat. A defendant’s intent to confuse constitutes
probative evidence of likely confusion: Courts assume
that the defendant’s intentions were carried out
successfully. In this case, the evidence does not
definitively establish defendants’ intent. At a minimum,
however, it does suggest that defendants do nothing to
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prevent click-throughs that result from confusion.
Moreover, they profit from such click-throughs.
Playboy Enterprises, 354 F.3d at 1028.
The same is true here. The evidence in this case establishes, at a minimum,
that Amazon did nothing to avoid confusion on the part of its customers who
searched for an MTM watch, such as stating that the requested product was not
carried on Amazon. Indeed, the evidence suggests that Amazon fomented such
confusion by providing directly competitive search results, displaying MTM’s
federally registered trademark multiple times as part of the search query results,
including once inside quotes, suggesting to customers that the results displayed
were exactly what the customer searched for. [ER 209.] Instead, Amazon
displayed directly competitive products without such labeling and profited from
any purchases made by such customers. Accordingly, here, as in Playboy
Enterprises, this factor therefore favors MTM. The District Court erred by failing
to consider this factor.
5.

The District Court Failed to Properly Consider the Proximity of
the Goods (Factor 2) and the Similarity of the Marks (Factor 3),
Both of Which Favor MTM

The District Court erred by failing to consider the proximity of the goods
sold by MTM and Amazon, respectively, and by failing to consider the similarity
of the marks, both of which favor MTM. With respect to both factors, the Court
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reasoned that these factors are only relevant if the consumer is confused, and that
these factors were therefore not relevant. [ER 13-14.] Given that these are factors
which assist in the determination of whether there is a likelihood of confusion, it is
circular, erroneous and illogical not to consider these factors unless a
determination of confusion has already been made. Simply put the products are
identical in their style and function and pricing. Accordingly, both proximity of
the goods and similarity of the marks should have been considered by the District
Court as part of its likelihood of confusion analysis.
(a)

Proximity of the Goods (Factor 2)

With respect to the proximity of the goods, after noting that “[r]elated goods
are generally more likely than unrelated goods to confuse the public as to the
producers of the goods,” the Network Automation Court explained that “the
proximity of the goods would become less important if advertisements are clearly
labeled or consumers exercise a high degree of care, because rather than being
misled, the consumer would merely be confronted with choices among similar
products.” See also Playboy Enterprises, supra, at 1028 (“The proximity between
PEI’s and its competitor’s goods provides the reason Netscape keys PEI’s marks to
competitor’s banner advertisements in the first place. Accordingly, this factor
favors PEI as well.”)
Here, MTM’s watches and Amazon’s search-generated Luminox watches
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are direct competitors, who both offer identically styled military watches that
consumers could easily confuse, as a visual comparison between images of MTM
watches and the Luminox watches displayed by Amazon makes clear. [ER 208,
214, 232, 294.]7
Additionally, as discussed above, there is no labeling informing persons
searching for MTM Special Ops watches that those watches were not carried by
Amazon and that the visually similar Luminox displayed were not MTM watches,
but other products offered as an alternative. Therefore, the proximity of goods
should have been considered by the District Court as part of the likelihood of
confusion analysis. Given that the goods in question, namely military style
watches, are identical in style, function and pricing , this factor weighs strongly in
favor of MTM, and the District Court erred by failing to consider this factor.
(b)

Similarity of the Marks (Factor 3)

In Network Automation, the court found that the district court had
“erroneously treated “ActiveBatch,” the keyword purchased by Network, as
conceptually separate from ActiveBatch the trademark owned by Systems.” Id. at
1151. The Court reasoned that “because the consumer keys in Systems’
trademark, which results in Network’s sponsored link, depending on the labeling
and appearance of the advertisement, including whether it identifies Network’s
7

See images set forth at page 8, supra.
-47-

1441768.4

Case: 13-55575

09/26/2013

ID: 8797539

DktEntry: 8-1

Page: 56 of 60

own mark, and the degree of care and sophistication of the consumer, it could be
helpful in determining initial interest confusion.” Id. Likewise, in Playboy
Enterprises, the Court found in favor of the plaintiff on this factor, because “the
terms defendants use are identical to PEI’s marks.” Playboy Enterprises, supra at
1028.
Here the district court found that in reproducing MTM’s mark, “Amazon
uses it identically,” but nevertheless found that “this factor is not independently
relevant.” It was erroneous for the court to have so concluded and to have granted
summary judgment in Amazon’s favor without considering this factor, which
weights in MTM’s favor.
VIII.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, MTM respectfully requests that the Court reverse
the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in Amazon’s favor.
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